National Incident Management Organization Social Media How To Manual
(4MB pdf posted 3/10/2010)
Disclaimer: This document should not be construed as direction or permission to use social media on Federal wildland fires. It is simply a “primer” on how to use a variety of tools for those who want to build skills. Decisions about social media use are between each individual and their agency.
Lessons Learned: Supervision - Loading an ATV onto a Truck
(1MB pdf posted 3/10/2010)
"A Forest Service employee attended a February 2010 ATV licensing class and was loading the ATV onto the back of a pick-up truck at the end of the training. Another FS employee had placed the ramp against the back of the truck bed, but had not inserted the two strap hooks into the holes which secure the ramp to the bed of the truck. As the FS employee was driving the ATV up the ramp he applied more power in order to transition from the inclined ramp to the bed of the truck..."
Fire Behavior Research and Operational Fire Behavior Considerations
(2MB pdf posted 3/4/2010)
Keynote Address 2: 4th Plenary Fire Paradox Meeting, 9-13 June 2008
Prediction of Spotting in Wildland Fires
(4MB pdf posted 3/4/2010)
MITACS/GEOIDE Conference on Forest Fire Modeling June 22-23, 2009 - Hinton, AB
Willow Helibase Rappel Accident - Preliminary Aircraft Accident Investigation Report
(3MB pdf posted 3/3/2010)
On July 21, 2009, Thomas David Marovich, Jr. a Rappeller from the Chester Helitack Crew attached to the Lassen National Forest sustained fatal injuries from an un-arrested descent during a proficiency rappel just southeast of the Willow Creek Helibase. The Helibase was established to support the Backbone Fire on the Six Rivers National Forest in Northern California. The Chester crew was one of three helitack crews that were planning to conduct proficiency rappels that morning. Proficiency rappels are required every 14 days to maintain technical competency if the helitack crew is not conducting operational rappel assignments. The Chester crew began preparing for their proficiency rappels after the Price Valley Helitack Crew had completed their proficiency rappels.
Willow Helibase Rappel Accident - SAI Action Plan
(77KB pdf posted 3/3/2010)
The following reccomendations are from the Accident Review Board that convened on November 12, 2009 to review the safety investigation report of the Willow Helibase Rappel Accident Fatality.
Technical Bulletin 10-02 - Interagency Guidance on Toning of the National Flight Following Frequency
(121KB pdf posted 3/2/2010)
10-01 - Defective PremoFire/Vanguard Plastic Spheres
(401KB pdf posted 2/25/2010)
6 Minutes for Safety - Write Your Own Safety Discussion
( ocx posted 2/24/2010)
Leading Connection Development and Knowledge Flow
(60KB pdf posted 2/24/2010)
"Leading Connection Development and Knowledge Flow to Increase High Reliability Organizing Implementation Effectiveness" is a paper delivered at the 3rd International High Reliability Organizing Workshop in New Orleans, LA by David Christenson, Acting Center Manager of the U.S. Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center.
Hang-ups: ‘Take a Second Look’
(889KB pdf posted 2/11/2010)
Hang-ups can either be present naturally or can be created when a faller drops a tree and the tree being felled “hangs up” and does not reach the ground. This scenario presents one of the most difficult and dangerous felling operations you will face when performing chain saw operations. The size of the trees involved may be relatively unimportant; consider the damage that can be done to the human body with a piece of wood the diameter of a baseball bat. When a hang-up occurs, a simple operation can quickly turn into a complex situation requiring a complete reassessment along with the skills and knowledge of our most experienced operators. With a hang-up, the faller has basically created a completely new felling situation and it should be assessed accordingly.
Team Center User's Guide - Feb. 2010 version
(3MB pdf posted 2/11/2010)
This user guide describes the functions of the Team Center at IMTcenter.net. Topics include how to get a site started for your team, what functions come standard with each site, and how to customize your site.
Indians Fire 72 Hour
(130KB pdf posted 2/9/2010)
On June 11, 2008 at approximately 1600 hrs LPF Engine 71 with five crew members (four on the ground and one driver) was supporting a holding action during a firing operation along the Del Venturi Road. Between 1625 and 1635 hrs a sudden change in the fire behavior occurred resulting in the burn over of four engine crew members and the engine with driver in an entrapment. While attempting to return to the engine, three crew members opened their fire shelters to deflect the radiant heat the fourth crewmember was able to return to Engine 71 the driver and the crewmember were able to back out of the fire to a safe area. The three crewmembers making their way along the road were picked up by a vehicle driven by the Division Supervisor. The three crewmembers were driven to a safe location and moved from the Division Supervisor’s vehicle to rejoin Engine 71, where the driver and fifth member were waiting. A rapid medical assessment was conducted by line EMT’s on scene and the crew drove to the ICP Medical Unit.
Chalk Fire Vehicle Accident 72 Hour 2008
( pdf posted 2/9/2010)
San Bernardino National Forest (BDF) Engine #56, with five crew members, drifted off the right hand side of a paved two lane road and caught a four to six inch drop between the asphalt and shoulder. The driver attempted to correct the situation causing the engine to veer across the two lane road, hit an embankment and roll over. The engine landed on the passenger side adjacent to the left hand side of the road.
Chalk Fire Vehicle Accident APA 2008
(880KB pdf posted 2/9/2010)
On Oct. 3, 2008, San Bernardino Engine 56 was involved in a rollover accident while assigned to
the Chalk Fire on the Los Padres National Forest. The accident occurred at approximately 1940
hours when the engine was enroute, as part of Strike Team 6609C, to a night shift assignment.
The accident, of which Engine 56 was the only vehicle involved, occurred on a paved, dry and
clear, narrow, twolane
road within the Fort Hunter Leggett Military Base. The five crew
members aboard the engine were treated at the scene and transported to a local hospital where
they were treated and released with minor injuries.
FS Health Screening Questionnaire
(48KB pdf posted 2/8/2010)
Updated in 2009, this is the Health Screening Questionnaire used by the Forest Service.
Informed Consent Form
(81KB pdf posted 2/8/2010)
Updated in 2009, this is the Informed Consent form used by the Forest Service.
Twin Prescribed Fire Escaped Fire Review
(1MB pdf posted 2/4/2010)
"On Thursday October 1, 2009, the Twin Prescribed Fire was ignited southwest of the town of Williams, AZ. Several spots occurred outside of the burn unit that afternoon. The next morning more spots were found east of the burn unit in heavy fuels and relatively inaccessible terrain. One of these spots became established beyond the capacity for control by ground forces resulting in an escape and a subsequent conversion to wildfire."
Loss of Fire Engine 3662 During High Water Crossing of Gila River-Accident Investigation Factual Report
(818KB pdf posted 2/4/2010)
"On Sunday September 6, 2009, Engine 3662 (3662) a type 6 engine from the Colorado River District stationed in the Yuma Field Office was involved in an accident while attempting to cross a flooded portion of the Gila River North of Yuma. As a result a large portion of 3662 was submerged in four to five feet of water for approximately one hour. The accident was caused as 3662 attempted to make a high water crossing of a normally passable river ford. Heavy rains from the day before had left the river well above its normal levels and the engine was submerged in the Gila River to the bottom of the windshield. There were no injuries to the crew. Damage to the engine is still being ascertained."
Hazmat Release and Exposure Incident CA- LPF
(221KB pdf posted 2/1/2010)
On January 18, 2010 five firefighters from the USDA Forest Service were transported to local emergency room for examination due to inhalation of an unknown hazardous material which caused some of them to react with hacking and coughing.
Blank CWPP in Access
(4MB cdb posted 2/1/2010)
This is a blank CWPP in Microsoft Access.
Why we need CWPPs
(14KB ocx posted 1/29/2010)
Why do we need CWPPs? There are many reasons, including increased awareness. CwPPs are a plan that can be used for almost all large incidents. The information collected on these plans is intended to be integrated into DFR GIS projects.
Preparedness Planning Training Outline
(27KB ocx posted 1/29/2010)
Preparedness planning is a key element for successful decision making. This document is a Lesson Outline using a streamlined Preparedness Planning Model to increase decision making space and risk management success.
Preparedness Planning Checklist
(21KB ocx posted 1/29/2010)
Items to consider in Preparedness Planning: A Potential Checklist
Role of a CWPP
( pdf posted 1/29/2010)
CWPPs provide communities with opportunities to influence where and how federal agencies implement fuel reduction projects on federal lands and how additional federal funds may be distributed for projects on non-federal lands. This document outlines 8 steps for conducting a CWPP.
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